| | | | Engagement With China Hasn't Failed | | While some in the US have argued it's time for a tougher line on China, after decades of welcoming policies have failed to liberalize it, Alastair Iain Johnston makes a few strong counterpoints in an essay for The Washington Quarterly.
For one, it's overly simplistic to call China a spoiler in the US-led international order, as that "order" is complicated, and China's support for the UN and arms-control agreements undermines the point. China may not have democratized, but American proponents of engagement never really saw that as a sure consequence of engaging. The notion that America would be better positioned to head off China's rise, had it not opened up a diplomatic and economic relationship, is misguided, Johnston writes; in fact, things might be much worse.
All of which supports a simmering opposition to President Trump's all-out confrontation with China, voiced today by Bloomberg, that the US-China relationship doesn't have to be driven by across-the-board, clash-of-civilizations enmity. | | A Turning Point for Iran's Nuclear Program? | | Now that Iran will surpass uranium-enrichment limits laid out in the 2015 nuclear deal, John J. Mearsheimer argues in The New York Times that President Trump's approach to Iran has ultimately failed, and we should expect Tehran to develop a nuclear bomb.
In light of Trump's pressure campaign, he writes, Iran has much more incentive to do so. "After all, Iran now faces an existential threat from the United States, and a nuclear arsenal will go a long way toward eliminating it," Mearsheimer writes. The only way out of this spiral, Mearsheimer argues, is for Trump to deescalate and seek to negotiate a new deal; but he won't, Mearsheimer predicts, calling that path "a blunder that will drive Iran to join the nuclear club." | | The New Normal of Talking with North Korea | | | President Trump's sudden meeting with Kim Jong Un may or may not have been a good thing: Foreign Policy's Michael Hirsh notes the international recognition Trump gave away, while Eric Gomez suggests at The National Interest that a "relationship transformation" under Trump might open the door for more "realistic agreements," short of North Korean denuclearization.
But the new norms of communication are notable, The Atlantic's Uri Friedman writes. Until recently, when South Korea or the US wanted to get a message to North Korea, ringing phones would literally go unanswered, and officials would read messages to cameras held by North Korean soldiers across the border. Now, Trump has at least opened up channels of communication, Friedman writes, surmising the newly opened "leader-to-leader channel could provide an avenue for avoiding conflict." | | Culture Wars Over Climate | | That's how The Economist poses today's climate politics, citing a cultural backlash against Europe's growing green movement. The divide over climate policies, as with immigration, is "within societies: between big cities with their Fridays for Future marches, car-free days and liberal politics, and small towns where the old ways of doing things die less easily," the magazine writes.
At the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman makes a similar point, focusing on Australia, where climate is a top concern on the left, but where Prime Minister Scott Morrison successfully "portrayed the opposition Labor party as urban snobs whose proposals would deprive Australians of their pick-up trucks and Sunday roasts." As liberal voters feel more strongly about climate policies, and as conservatives capitalize on cultural resentment, the next big battle might be in the American Midwest, where Democrats will be selling aggressive policies like the Green New Deal in 2020, Rachman writes. | | Europe's Next Security Challenges | | Two security challenges are falling into Europe's lap, according to a paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations and a World Politics Review piece by Peter Dörrie. The former outlines how Libya's civil war is becoming a problem only Europe can solve—the US and Russia haven't been willing or able to settle it, and regional players risk escalation that would see Europe "become ever more vulnerable to the activities of terrorist groups and people smugglers"—while the latter focuses on the Sahel.
In West Africa, European security missions have tried, and failed, to quell jihadist insurgencies and militia violence. The problem isn't as close to Europe's doorstep, but local frustration is growing with France and Germany, which could face hard domestic debates over whether they're willing to invest the money and lives required to improve things, in a region that could be the next major hotspot for extremism. | | | | | | |
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